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Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University
1. My aim today is to present a sketch of Jeremy Bentham’s views on
punishment, its sources in his writings, and some of its central features. As you will
soon see, what I have to say can perhaps be best described as work in progress.
2. What would naturally occur to anyone interested in Bentham’s views on
punishment would be to study the book titled Rationale of Punishment, attributed to
Jeremy Bentham on the title page as sole author, published in 1830 in London and in
English. 2 What more could we want for an account of someone’s theory of
punishment than his being the author of a book titled Rationale of Punishment?
3. Very well, let us take a look at this book. Although it appears under
Bentham’s name and has been used by countless scholars as Bentham’s work, it was
in fact stitched together from various of Bentham’s manuscripts by one of Bentham’s
young acolytes, Richard Smith. During the day Smith was a minor official in the
government’s bureau of taxation, but in his spare time he was a devoted editor of
several of Bentham’s otherwise unpublished writings. Much of the content of the
Rationale can be found virtually verbatim in the surviving manuscripts written in
various hands and stored in the Bentham archive of University College London.
Smith used this material to flesh out the Rationale from the earlier French version of
1811, edited by Etienne Dumont, a diligent and faithful friend of Bentham’s. There is
no evidence that Bentham ever looked at the product of Smith’s labors (he did look at
Dumont’s), much less that he guided it through the press or otherwise was involved in
editing it.
4. For these reasons we might advisedly call this book the Smith–Bentham
Rationale. Ideally for the purposes of posterity Smith would have turned over to the
archives the complete manuscript copy of the text used by the printer to produce the
Rationale. But so far as we know, he did not do this; none of that text is known to
1 Paper given at the Bentham Seminar, UCL, 10 March 2004.
2 J. Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, ed. E. Dumont and transl. Richard Smith, London, 1830.
See also Part II of ‘Principles of Penal Law’ in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols.,
Edinburgh, 1843, i. pp. 388-524, in which the ‘Rationale of Punishment’ is produced as part of a larger
‘Principles of Penal Law’.
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survive in any form—or if it is to be found among the surviving manuscripts, there
seems to be no record or indication that some of the surviving manuscripts were in
fact used by the printer. In any case we have it on good authority that Bentham’s
practice was to discard the manuscript text of a book of his once the book had been
published. The result is that the surviving manuscripts in the UCL archive have a very
uncertain status so far as representing Bentham’s best or final thoughts about
punishment (and about many other topics as well).
5. If at this very late date we want to construct a theory of punishment on
Bentham’s behalf, what resources do we have for the job? What obstacles do we face
in carrying out that task? First, let us note the several texts of varying importance at
our disposal for this purpose:
First, there are the published materials:
 First on this list is Etienne Dumont’s Theorie des Peines et Recompenses, a
two-volume work of 1811, published in Geneva in French, and—as we see on
the title page—purporting to be Bentham’s book. The first volume of this work
is the source of most of what was later translated and published in English by
Smith as the Rationale—as a comparison of the tables of contents of the two
volumes will reveal.3
 Second, there is Rationale of Punishment, by Richard Smith published in
1830 and reprinted in 1843 in the Works of Jeremy Bentham edited by John
Bowring. It is this text in Bowring’s edition that is the most widely used version
of the Bentham–Smith book.
 Third, there are the Panopticon ‘letters’ of 1787, republished in the Works
edited by Bowring.4
 Fourth, there is ‘Jeremy Bentham to his fellow-citizens of France, On Death-
Punishment’ (1831), a short essay published by Bowring in Bentham’s Works as
an appendix to the Smith–Bentham Rationale.5
 Fifth, there are large sections of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation (IPML) originally written by Bentham prior to 1780 and
3 J. Bentham and E. Dumont, Theorie des Peines et des Recompenses, 2 vols, Geneva and London,
1811.
4 ‘Panopticon; or the Inspection-House’, Bowring, iii. pp. 37-172
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published in that year and again in 1789 in a revised edition. Much of the most
theoretical aspects of Bentham’s views on punishment appear only in this
volume.6
Then there are the unpublished materials, among them the following:
 ‘Law versus arbitrary power, or a hatchet for Dr Paley’s net’, a mss written in
1808–1810; a transcription of this text is on file in the offices of the Bentham
Project, but so far remains unpublished.
 ‘JB to France against the death penalty, on death for the French ex ministers’
(1830), an unedited and unpublished short epistle.
There are also passages in other of his published writings, some available only since
his death, e.g. A Comment on the Commentaries, written in the mid 1790s but not
published until 1928, and Of Laws in General, written in 1782 but not published until
1970.7
Last but by no means least, there are a thousand or so manuscript folios in the
Bentham archives in UCL spread across his career but mostly written in two stages:
the earliest surviving mss are from the mid 1770s, the latest from the early 1810s.
Many ,but not all, of the folios are in Bentham’s own hand. Only now—literally, as of
this week—have they all been transcribed, though much still needs to be done before
these transcriptions are complete and accurate. These manuscripts have rarely been
consulted except by a few diligent scholars; it is clear from Bentham’s
correspondence that they were intended to be the chief source for a book he was
writing in the mid 1770s under the title Theory of Punishment. It is the reconstruction
of this book that Bentham never finished that is my principal self-appointed
occupation.
5 J. Bentham, ‘Jeremy Bentham to his Fellow-Citizens of France, on Death-Punishment, London, 1831.
See also Bowring, i. pp. 525-532.
6 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Oxford,
1996 (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham). Hereafter IPML.
7 J. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries: a Criticism of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on
the Laws of England, ed. Charles Warren Everett, London, 1928; A Comment on the Commentaries and
A Fragment of Government, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Oxford, 1970 (The Collected Works of
Jeremy Bentham), hereafter Comment (CW); and Of Laws in General, ed. H.L.A. Hart, Oxford, 1970
(CW), hereafter Of Laws (CW).
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Anything that claims to be Bentham’s theory of punishment must address and
incorporate, where appropriate, all these materials. It is a major task awaiting
someone energetic and patient enough to undertake it. Today I will discuss only a
small fraction of this large topic.
6. As I noted a moment ago, it is clear from Bentham’s correspondence during
the 1770s that he was hard at work on a book he provisionally titled Theory of
Punishment—we learn this from a footnote in his Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation of 1789, as well as from his correspondence and other
writings of those years.8 This book was never completed as such. Instead, in 1789
IPML was published, a large fraction of which is devoted to the theory of punishment.
Four decades later the Smith–Bentham Rationale of Punishment was published,
bearing an uncertain (and so far unexplored) relation to Bentham’s intentions in the
1770s.
7. Let us leave aside further discussion of the sources we have from which to
reconstruct Bentham’s theory of punishment and look at what we can learn about his
views from consulting the tables of contents (ToCs) for his books mentioned above.
The first version of a ToC for Bentham’s ‘Theory’, date unknown, is
conjectured to have been written between 1780 and 1785 on two mss sheets (not in
Bentham’s hand) in a folio in UCL Box 99 and titled ‘Theory of Punishment’
(Appendix 1). A. T. Milne’s bibliography unfortunately fails to identify the relevant
folios for this topic, thus effectively burying the topic until uncovered by some recent
grave digging.9 This ToC precedes the Dumont and Smith books by several years, and
the topics it proposes are fewer than those in the later French and English versions.
This ToC is provisionally dated several years after Bentham had put work on his
‘Theory’ to the side in favor of other projects. There seems to be no evidence that
Bentham had in mind a different, earlier ToC contemporaneous with his work on the
book in the mid 1770s.
In any case, the title heading this ToC is presumably for a book to be called
‘Theory of Punishment’ The ToC itself is described in a heading on the folio as the
‘Table of Contents of the Work’. This also suggests that at some point Bentham
8 IPML (CW), p. 58n; UC cxliii. fo. 14, dated 1778.
9 A. T. Milne, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham, in the Library of University College,
London, 2nd edition, London, 1962.
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intended this to be the ToC for his book, the ‘Theory of Punishment’, that
preoccupied him during the 1770s.
Whether this ToC had any influence on the much later editions of Dumont (1811)
and Smith (1839) is hard to tell. Many of the topics in this ToC are identical with
topics in the ToCs of their books. The sequence in which the topics are discussed in
these books closely resembles the sequence of topics in the Dumont and Smith
versions. Three major topics—punishment by way of torture, the death penalty, and
the Panopticon—that figure in the Dumont and Smith books, have no place in this
early ToC. Thus it is obvious from these ToCs that the book on punishment that
Bentham never finished departs in many ways from the versions published by
Dumont and by Smith.
Conspicuous by its absence in this ToC of 1780–85 is any material for an
Introduction (five out of the six topics identified in the ToC as the Introduction to
Theory are struck out by someone); they turn out to be related to material that now
appears as the first chapter of IPML. It is more than possible that Bentham took
material from his intended ‘Theory of Punishment’ and used it instead to open IPML,
causing him to strike out these passages from the ToC under discussion. A major
challenge to the reconstruction of Bentham’s ‘Theory’ is to decide what material, if
any, is available in the archives that can serve as the basis for constructing an
introduction for this book. Whether either Dumont or Smith knew of this ToC and if
so, why he/they chose to depart from it, is unknown.
How far in the reconstruction of Bentham’s ‘Theory of Punishment’ should we
use this ToC as our guide? I return to this question shortly.
Dumont reports that the mss on which he relied for his version of Bentham’s
theory ‘were written [by Bentham] in 1775’. He added that he ‘freely used the rights
of an Editor—according to the nature of the text and the occasion, I have translated,
commented, abridged, or supplied’. To which he added, ‘this co-operation on my part
has had reference to the details only, and ought not to diminish the confidence of the
readers; it is not my work that I present to them, it is, as faithfully as the nature of
things will permit, the work of Mr Bentham’.
The resulting book by Dumont is clearly the earliest published text in any
language purporting to be something that could be called without much controversy
the chief printed source for Bentham’s theory of punishment. The ToC for Dumont’s
version seems not to have enjoyed any supervision or revision by Bentham. Worse
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than that, in his correspondence Bentham describes the Theorie as Dumont’s book,
‘not mine’, thus distancing himself from the finished product, and leaving the reader
unsure just how to take this authorial disavowal.
Smith’s 1830 English edition is heavily based on Dumont’s 1811 version. The
English title, however—Rationale of Punishment—is not Dumont’s; presumably it is
Smith’s, perhaps chosen to distinguish his book from Bentham’s unfinished and
unpublished ‘Theory of Punishment’ of the mid 1770s. There seem to be no surviving
mss in which Bentham or one of his secretaries uses Smith’s title to describe any of
the material in mss form.
As noted earlier, a sample of topic-by-topic comparison of the Smith Bentham
Rationale with the Dumont–Bentham Theorie reveals considerable divergence
between the two. Smith correctly notes in the ‘Advertisement’ at the front of the
Rationale that his version is not ‘a literal translation’ of Dumont’s French version, nor
is it an assemblage exclusively of Bentham’s own manuscripts on the theory of
punishment. Instead, Smith tells us that he ‘availed himself, wherever he could, of the
original manuscripts’—manuscripts presumably mostly if not entirely in English.10 As
for ‘wherever he could’ not ‘avail himself of the original manuscripts’, he contributed
a version of what he thought Bentham would have said, or at least would not have
disapproved.
How much material in the Smith–Bentham Rationale is in fact neither Bentham
nor Dumont, but contributed by Smith (much as were Dumont’s additions) in the
belief that Bentham would have approved, is difficult to say. A reconstruction of
Bentham’s own views from surviving mss in his own hand (or that of a faithful
amanuensis) depends crucially on being able to make these distinctions. Smith did not
include in his legacy any indications of the extent and character of his own
contributions.
How closely does the Smith–Bentham Rationale (as reprinted in 1843 by
Bowring in the first volume of Bentham’s Works) track the earlier 1830 version by
Smith? Apparently it has always been tacitly assumed that the two versions are
identical, with differences if any confined to matters of format, pagination, and the
like. But so far as I know no one has left any record of a word-for-word comparison
of the two English texts (or, while we are at it, of either English text with the French).
10 Bowring, i. p. 388.
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Such discrepancies between the two that I have noticed in a very small sample of
passages are relatively minor. On the strength of such comparisons, one might
plausibly assume that the discrepancies in the two texts are correspondingly
insignificant. Short of conducting a word-for-word comparison of the two English
versions, however, we cannot be sure how close the two texts really are. For my
reconstructive purposes, it doesn’t matter how this question is resolved.
In addition to the material already reviewed, rummaging around in obscure
papers deposited with the Bentham Project four or five years ago turned up a detailed
ToC prepared by J. M. Phillips while he was on the Project staff some forty years ago
(probably in the late 1960s). He describes his ToC as ‘[a] catalogue of Punishment
mss arranged [in] the order of possible publication, excluding the “Introduction”‘.
Little is known today about Phillips and his association with the Project. Yet as his
ToC and adjacent typescripts in his papers demonstrate, he had by far the most
complete understanding of Bentham’s intentions and of Bentham’s surviving
manuscripts devoted to the theory of punishment.
In addition to providing us with a ToC for Bentham’s unfinished book, Phillips
accomplished another major task. He identified a hundred (102, to be exact) topics
that constituted the book and coordinated with them the relevant manuscript folios
from the archives. The result is that for the first time we have a clear picture of what
constituted the text of Bentham’s ‘Theory’.
On what principles did Phillips construct the ToC for this book? He divided the
surviving mss into four sets, those determined by author and those determined by date.
If Smith was the author (whether or not based on Dumont) of a portion of text and not
Bentham nor copied for him by an amanuensis, Phillips proposed to exclude the text.
(More precise criteria for distinguishing between the two sets of mss are nowhere
stated in Phillips’s papers that survive in the Project offices. Clearly, most reliance
was placed on deciphering the handwriting in a folio in order to assign the text to
Bentham, or to Smith, or to some third writer.) In any case, since the Bentham Project
has no interest in publishing material written by anyone other than Bentham,
identifying material by Dumont and Smith in order to exclude it is crucial.
Orthogonal to the division by author is a division by date. Anything on
punishment not from the 1770s, except for a few folios dated around 1811, Phillips
proposed to exclude, on the ground that such manuscripts have at best a dubious
relevance to Bentham’s intentions of the mid.1770s.
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The folios that remain after these exclusions—call them the Bentham set—
number about 575, out of a total of nearly a thousand in the entire UCL archive that
are mentioned by A. T. Milne as dealing with punishment.
Phillips’ legacy, valuable as it is, still leaves much to be done. No transcripts by
Phillips of any Bentham mss on punishment have been found. It is clear that Phillips
thought that his ToC, if faithfully followed, would yield a book as close as humanly
possible at this late date to the book on punishment that Bentham in his early
manhood wrote but never completed, much less published.
In any case, even though Smith’s ToC departs notably from the other ToCs cited
above, in my judgment it convincingly constitutes the best version of the book on
punishment Bentham never completed.
Nothing can be seriously considered to be Bentham’s theory of punishment
unless it takes into account all these materials—a considerable undertaking. Given the
magnitude and diversity of the relevant materials at our disposal, here I can do no
more than sketch some of the main and enduring features of his views, as well as trace
out a few of the important topics on which his views changed.
8. Let us notice first two very different statements from the mid.1770s by
Bentham that sketch the main features of his project. The first and briefer seems never
to have been developed further. The second and longer (and possibly a draft of the
Introduction, Chapter VI, to his ‘Theory’; see appendix 2) gives a much better sketch
of the nature and status of the theory of punishment and hints at the central role of two
characteristic features of most of his thinking: his consequentialism and his hedonism,
which together constitute his utilitarianism.
9. Next, let us note a matter of style, the form in which Bentham chose to cast
his views. To a remarkable extent his typical discussion of a topic proceeds by
offering the reader one taxonomy after another, that is, lists of species under a given
genus—a method of analysis of which he was inordinately proud but is nothing more
than a familiar tactic in classical rhetoric. By way of illustration, consider what we
find in IPML chapter xvi, §§ 32.35, on ‘The Division of Offences’. Here Bentham
offers the reader the identification and discussion of five kinds of distress one person
can cause another, nine ways in which a person can be caused personal injury, two
kinds of offenses against reputation, and nineteen kinds of offenses against property.
This is the barest sample of Bentham’s love affair with the taxonomy of crimes and
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punishments. He called it his method of ‘bipartition’ or ‘bifurcation’.11 Actually, as
the example above show, division of a genus into two species—suggested by his
terms ‘bifurcation’ and ‘bipartition’—was a rarity. Three or often more species under
a genus typically emerge from Bentham’s scrutiny of topic after topic.
10. Why does Bentham devote so much attention to distinguishing species under
a genus? I think it is because he is convinced that one cannot evaluate a given practice
or proposal without considering alternative practices and proposals, in the attempt at
making one’s survey of options as complete as possible. Identifying these alternatives
is a crucial feature of utilitarian thinking, since the challenge facing the utilitarian
thinker is to find out which among the available alternative practices or policies gives
(what we might call in today’s jargon) the best cost/benefit ratio.
11. So far as Bentham’s central views relevant to the theory of punishment are
concerned, they can be stated in a dozen or so summary paraphrases, all of which can
be found in IPML (along with much else) as well as in the manuscripts that survive
intended for his ‘Theory of Punishment’:
a. Punishment may be defined as an evil inflicted on an offender by
persons in authority. (More than a century earlier Hobbes had
defined punishment in his Leviathan (1651) in much the same way).
b. Punishment may be justified, if at all, as the least worst use of
coercion in the name of securing public safety, in the belief that the
gain in security—the satisfactions of living in a secure society—
outweighs the loss in punishment, which involves deliberately
causing harm to offenders. In short, an increase in public safety
achieved through general deterrence and individual reformation of
convicted offenders.
c. ‘All punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil,’
Bentham says, and therefore is to be reduced to the minimum in
severity (intensity, duration) consistent with securing its ends.12 This
is Bentham’s paramount claim, and it marks off his theory from all
nonconsequentialist theories of punishment.
11 IPML (CW), pp. 187 (note a), 83-84.
12 Ibid., p. 159.
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d. Punishment is an evil because, in the nature of the case, it must be
(or be perceived to be) painful or worse—and nobody likes being in
pain.
e. Thus punishment is a practice essentially forward-looking (to
prevent crime and secure public safety), not a practice essentially
backward-looking (to render retribution based on desert). It has three
goals: prevention of crime, correction of offenders, and
compensation of victims.13 This is a corollary of his utilitarianism.
f. Punishments must be apportioned to crimes so that the would-be
offender is always given an incentive to commit a less serious crime
(e.g. rape) rather than a more serious one (e.g. rape and murder).
g. The punitive sanctions available to magistrates fall into three
classes— political, moral, and religious. (Earlier Bentham identified
a fourth sanction, the ‘physical’, but he abandoned it no doubt
because each of the other three sanctions involves physical coercion
or the threat thereof in one way or another). Of these the most
important for the legislator is the political sanction—punishment
authorized by the criminal law and imposed by a judge on someone
found to have violated the law without excuse or justification.
h. Afflictive punishments, chief of which is the death penalty, are to be
avoided wherever possible in favor of less brutal interventions.
i. The kinds of punishment most attractive to the general public are
those that are most analogous to the crime, e.g. the death penalty for
murder.
j. Torture cannot be ruled out categorically; it is justifiable if by
torturing one guilty person many who are innocent can be spared
injury—a direct application of the principle of utility to the
evaluation of a public policy.
k. As viewed by persons likely to commit crimes, some punishments
appear to be more severe than they are, others are just the reverse—
they are less severe than they appear to be. Capital punishment is an
example of the first, life imprisonment an example of the second.
13 UC clix. fo. 108 (c. 1775-76).
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l. Prisons should be run as private profit-making institutions.
m. Cases unmeet for punishment are those that are either groundless,
inefficacious, or in unprofitable
n. Twelve rules define the proportioning of punishments to offenses, eg,
according to rule 1, ‘The value of a punishment must be not less in
any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the
offence’.14 These rules are one of the most important contributions to
the utilitarian theory of punishment, and carry that theory well
beyond what any of Bentham’s predecessors had to offer. We are left,
however, wondering whether there might be other rules that
Bentham has overlooked.
o. Punishments vary from each other in eleven ways, e.g. in their
popularity, remissibility, subservience to reformation, frugality, etc.
These factors present Bentham at his analytical best; they (like the
rules above) constitute an unrivalled contribution to the theory of
punishment and endure to our day as well. Again, however, we are
left wondering whether there might not be a further two or three such
variables that Bentham overlooked.
12. One of the best examples of Bentham’s change of view on important aspects
of his theory of punishment concerns the nature of imprisonment. In his early writings,
he favored a threefold regimen of ‘Solitude, Darkness, and Hard Labor’—to which he
sometimes added ‘Simple Diet’.15 The rationale seems to have been to break the
rebellious spirit of the prisoner and thus reduce the likelihood of recalcitrance in
prison and recidivism after release. Bentham came to see that his proposal if adopted
would be bound to destroy anyone who endured it year after year. His later proposal
of imprisonment under the Panopticon scheme (beginning ca. 1810) abandoned
darkness and hard diet in favor of gainful labor outside the prison walls. As Semple
put it in her excellent book on the Panopticon, ‘all would benefit; the injured party
would get compensation, the master would profit from the prisoner’s work, and the
14 IPML (CW), p. 166.
15 See UC lxix. fo. 3, cited in Janet Semple, Bentham’s Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary,
Oxford, 1993, p. 34.
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prisoner himself would be working for a master of his choice instead of in prison’.16
What could be better designed to please a utilitarian than such a scheme? The miseries
of detention and confinement would be reduced to the minimum and would easily be
outweighed by the many benefits distributed among the several parties.
13. No doubt the most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment is his
proposed Panopticon Prison, which more than any of his other projects occupied his
mind (and depleted his pocketbook) for years, as he sought without success for
support from Parliament to construct the necessary building. Bentham’s scheme was
made public as early as 1791 in a series of twenty-one so-called ‘letters’ written four
years earlier while travelling in Russia. As Semple pointed out, the fundamental
management philosophy of the Panopticon was ‘deterrence and reformation’, and the
administrative means to achieve these ends were ‘lenity, severity, and economy’.17 If
this seems to verge on the self-contradictory, that is because it does.
14. Bentham’s most famous philosophical principle is the principle of utility,
which he says is the ‘principle which approves or disapproves of every action
whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or
diminish the happiness if the party whose interest is in question; or ... in other words,
to promote or to oppose that happiness’.18 What makes him think that his various
punitive proposals can be defended on utilitarian grounds? Or does he fail to address
this crucial issue? If we consult the relevant passages in Bentham’s works, what do
we find? I shall have to postpone trying to answer these questions for another
occasion.
15. To what criticisms are Bentham’s punitive doctrines susceptible? There are
at least three. First, his theory completely ignores any rights of due process and equal
protection for the accused, the convicted, and the sentenced. In his view, all such
practices can be defended, if at all, only on utilitarian grounds. Such rights as we do
have are purely legal in source and nature; thus they are subject to review and revision
at any time. Here we see emerging his legal positivism. Second, his theory tacitly
encourages the authorities to ponder whether in a certain case it might be desirable to
arrest and prosecute someone they are not certain is guilty, because of the prospective
gain in perceived (even if not actual) public security from learning that an alleged
16 Semple, Bentham’s Prison, p. 35.
17 Ibid., pp. 112, 12.
18 IPML (CW), p. 12.
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offender had been arrested and prosecuted. Finally, his theory underestimates the
corruptibility and sharp practice of managers of prisons conceived as profit-making
enterprises.
16. Here I must close by suggesting that Bentham’s writings on punishment,
which span half a century (the mid.1770s through the early 1830s), are a rich source
worthy of much further study and reflection.
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Appendix Two
UCL Box 140, folio 060
Station of Punishment in the Map of Jurisprudence
Before we proceed to enter more particularly on the subject of Punishment, a few
words may be of use for the purpose of marking {in order to mark out the station
which that subject occupies in the general map of Jurisprudence. in other words for
the purpose of shewing {to shew} how the business of ordering the quantity quality
{and application} of punishment for every case of delinquency connects with the rest
of the business of Government-in a word to mark out the station which this subject
occupies in the general map of Jurisprudence. The use of this is to mark/trace out a
line of connection between the present work, and any future work which may be
executed on the same principles with a view of laying down what may be termed the
Theory of Politiks, or of the Art of Legislation. By this means, besides answering the
purpose of a detached work in this branch of the science, it may serve upon occasion
as the commencement and frontispiece of a much larger fabric.
As the advancement of the happiness of the community, that is the producing the
greatest quantity of {clear} pleasure that can be produced in it, and that alloy’d with
the least possible quantity of pain that can be admitted is or ought to be the perpetual
task of Government, so are pleasures and pains, the instruments in fact the only
instruments, it has to work with.
It is part of the general business of Government to produce pleasure: but when the
pleasure produced by any act of Government is produced not for it’s own sake [sheet
ends] but for the purpose of producing another and greater lot of pleasure or other
advantage, to wit by operating as a motive on those in whose power it is to produce
such greater pleasure, it is called Reward.
On the other hand so likewise is it the general business of Government to avert pain.
But if its producing pain even on purpose may on any occasion be the very and only
means of averting greater pain, or what comes to the same thing of producing a more
than equivalent pleasure, it becomes its business on such an occasion to produce pain
even on purpose. It is when pain is produced in this manner on purpose that it is stiled
Punishment.
In a word, the rest of the Law determines what it is men are to be made to do: so
much of it as concerns Punishment and Reward, by what means. Punishment is Pain.
Reward is Pleasure. The Law has to do with Pain as a means: with Pleasure, as a
means and as an end.
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